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Recent attempts to advance international cooperation have created a puzzle for strands of traditional International Relations (IR) scholarship. Why did the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen end without official agreement in 2009, while they succeeded one year later in Cancún? The largest summit ever, with 120 heads of state and government meeting in Denmark, was unable to achieve a binding comprehensive agreement on a major, looming global threat. The initial breakdown posed a serious risk to multilateral cooperation, and led to billions of dollars of costs from delayed action on climate mitigation and adaptation.
The puzzle which arises is that negotiation outcomes differed despite the fact that fundamental constellations of power and interests remained largely constant during these two years of negotiations. The US and all other major powers supported the final compromise package both in Copenhagen and Cancún. Nevertheless, it fell through in the first year, and agreement was only reached in Cancún, even so with a lower level of ambition. How could unchanged structural variables of neorealism and liberal institutionalism, however, capture a variance in outcomes? Other fields of IR consider the role of process more closely, such as strands of regime theory, constructivism, and bureaucratic theory. Overall though, we still lack a detailed account as to whether the summit in Copenhagen broke down due to clashing interests and lack of support by powerful countries, or due to ineffective negotiation management. Eventually, the analysis of the climate case pair reveals an influence of negotiation management on the outcome of the two summits -of course without claiming that it was the only decisive factor. Supporting the hypotheses of negotiation management, this suggests three contributions. First, the findings highlight the role of negotiation management in IR by integrating structural and process explanations and by fleshing out the paths of effect on the outcome. Second, they add to particular strands of negotiation theories. These contributions Negotiation Management and Multilateral Cooperation increase our understanding of the emergence of cooperation. Finally, the study grounds these theoretical considerations in extensive, first-hand data from the decision-makers of all key delegations and the UN, and adds this body of material on a pair of salient global negotiations to the field of IR.
The argument
This research develops a negotiation framework to analyze to what extent negotiation management adds to explain the outcomes of these multilateral negotiations in addition to structural approaches. It responds to the call of scholarship on multilateral cooperation to abandon overly parsimonious approaches (Keohane and Victor, 2011 , Mitchell, 2010 , Touval, 2010 , Woolcock, 2011 and acknowledges regime theory's finding that a multivariate approach best accumulates explanatory power (Osherenko and Young, 1993, Underdal, 2002) : there is a "need to look more at the process ('the how') as scholars have so far more focused on the conditions of regime creation ('the why')" (Jönsson, 2002) . Odell, for example, regrets the lacking integration of negotiation analysis, international political economy, and constructivism, and the "still primitive" knowledge about international organisation negotiations (Odell, 2010, 628) . With his synthesis of structure and process, Odell had earlier discovered process influence in the outcomes of ten bilateral economic negotiations (Odell, 2000) . A novel compendium of environmental regime creation confirms the trend towards process by distinguishing between structure, process, and institutional provisions (Mitchell, 2010, Ch. 5) . This negotiation framework therefore integrates structural and process explanations, and in addition, fills part of the gap on conditions and causal mechanisms of process left by regime theory (Figure 1 ). The dependent variable is negotiated agreement, and not 'failure/success' or 'outcome efficiency', which are often subjective and blurry criteria. A few people consider Copenhagen a "success", for instance, while most perceive of it as a "failure". The determination of outcome efficiency can also be a highly imprecise exercise, although this may still be possible for European integration negotiations (Moravcsik, 1999, 271 ). Yet, multilateral climate summits are much more complex. The attribution of weights to preferences on countless issues for over 190 countries would be a misleading simplification. Instead, 'negotiated agreement' mirrors a less nuanced but more reliable frequent practice (Albin and Young, 2012 , Bernauer and Mitchell, 2004 , 95, Odell, 2009 .
Negotiation Management and Multilateral Cooperation

The following four elements of negotiation management form the heart of the argument.
Regarding their selection, they clearly stood out from myriad negotiation management factors (e.g. time of issuing a Chair's text) in the respective scholarship, and in the exploratory interviews in Cancún. Negotiation management includes drivers primarily influenced by the organizers, and not by negotiating countries, as the process influence of delegations mostly depends on their interests and power (Young, 1994, 152) .
(1) Recent scholarship on economic and environmental regimes has increasingly emphasized how greater transparency and inclusiveness facilitate negotiations (Davenport et al., 2012 , 45, 53, Müller, 2011 , Odell, 2009 . A study on WTO negotiations in Cancún and Geneva in 2003 and 2004 discovered that agreement probability is influenced by procedural justice in a negotiation. In the ideal type of procedural justice transparency, fair representation, fair treatment, and voluntary agreement are all key elements to impact the attitude of delegates towards a final proposal (Albin and Young, 2012, 46-48) . Practitioners of the biosafety negotiations shared these findings (Köster, 2002 , Mayr, 2002 . Importantly though, full transparency and inclusiveness would prohibit to reduce complexity of myriad parties and issues so that compromises can be efficiently reached in the short time available. The climate case will examine the hypothesized effect of increased transparency and inclusiveness on agreement probability.
What indicates transparency and inclusiveness of a negotiation? Information management on small group negotiations is a first aspect of transparency. These often consist of only 20 to 60 delegates and play a central role in reducing the complexity of parties and issues.
Since the small group frequently addresses core areas, it becomes vital how well organizers inform the thousands of excluded delegates about its mandate, schedule, and participants.
Transparency also varies with the handling of compromise text, which is meant to satisfy the Negotiation Management and Multilateral Cooperation key positions of as many countries as possible after endless negotiations. Given this text's importance, how broadly organizers inform about its origin, evolution, and conclusion becomes crucial. Transparency finally depends on how diligently organizers update parties on the overall negotiation progress and schedule. As thousands of negotiators are scattered over myriad formal and informal groups, hardly anyone has a grasp of all key moves.
Small group negotiations are also a first indicator of inclusion. Countries want to participate in these salient meetings or at least be represented by their coalition members, which renders its selection process decisive. Second, negotiations occur across several levels, from experts up to heads of state and government. The integration of levels affects how expert negotiators and politicians perceive their inclusion. Third, organizers engage in extensive deliberation on parties' positions and solutions: how broadly do they reach out to countries to consider their views when facilitating compromise? Finally, the framing of a process as transparent and inclusive influences the perception of parties. These indicators jointly assess the relative transparency and inclusiveness by contrasting negotiations in the same regime.
(2) Research in the fields of bureaucratic theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, and transnational studies indicates that bureaucracies and individuals influence the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations (Mitchell, 2002, 506) . The negotiation framework builds on these approaches by proposing the negotiation management element of the capability of organizers. Bureaucratic theory and Foreign Policy Analysis have long argued for an autonomous impact of administrations (Allison, 1971 , Barnett and Finnemore, 1999 , 707, Weber, 1946 . Transnational studies have specifically researched international bureaucracies and found that many had such (albeit varying) autonomous influence as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators, and capacity builders (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009 (Jinnah, 2012) . Finally, the interplay among hosts and the supporting supranational Secretariat can have a crucial impact (Depledge, 2007) . So overall, internal strife and inappropriate facilitation by the respective bureaucracies may undermine their ability to foster agreement and partially explain a negotiation breakdown like that in Copenhagen.
Aside from bureaucracies, agency has been attributed to individuals in international politics (Byman and Pollack, 2001, Waltz, 1959) . Accordingly, the skill and energy of advocates of cooperation has an impact on negotiation outcomes (Underdal, 2002) . Individuals in a formal leadership position, such as the chair of a multilateral negotiation, the head of a treaty Secretariat, or the host country lead facilitator, have varied in their brokerage styles with respective impacts in several regimes, e.g. climate (Depledge, 2005) , trade (Odell, 2005) , and biosafety negotiations (Falkner, 2002) . The style also depended on their origin in high or low context cultures (Cohen, 1997) . While Moravcsik sees a greater effect by national than supranational leaders, such as in EU negotiations, he concedes that the mediating leeway of international bureaucracies and individual policy entrepreneurs is wider in the complex and chaotic settings of global negotiations (Moravcsik, 1999, 300) . (Tallberg, 2010) . The role of the chair's political capital (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011) mirrors the suggested concept of authority. Chairs with authority exercise their leverage to observe, formulate, and manipulate, such as in the WTO (Odell, 2005) . The consensus-requirement of many multilateral negotiations places abundant responsibility on them, for instance deciding during a turbulent final night on whether parties have reached an agreement.
As with capability, it is essential to measure authority of the lead organizer independent from the negotiation outcome, and to thus exclude tautology. Authority is indicated if delegates accept him or her widely, i.e. when the large majority of key negotiators as opinion leaders trust the lead organizer. Interview responses by negotiators and Secretariat officials were examined to what extent they express acceptance of the lead organizer at the time of the negotiations.
Responses were triangulated with participant observation in Cancún, the UN video footage of the Copenhagen closing plenary, and secondary sources. Owing to the subjective nature of 'trust', answers are counted in a binary (not continuous) way of 'overall trusted or not', and 'ambiguous/undecided'. The diversity of the sample (Table 1, below) controls for political biases. Overall, the influence on the choice of specific organizers by participating countries is obviously limited. Yet, each Presidency can of course carefully select the personality best suited for this specific task.
(4) The framework finally proposes that the negotiation mode of arguing facilitates the reaching of agreement. The term arguing is used here in the constructivist tradition as being largely synonymous with integrative bargaining and problem-solving (Odell, 2009 , 277, 281, 282, Thompson, 2009 . It builds on constructivist theory on the shaping of interests and positions of countries through ideas (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, Haggard and Simmons, 1987) . Regime theory (Mitchell, 2010, 117, Osherenko and Young, 1993, 13) , conflict research (e.g. Wagner, 2008) , and general negotiation analysis (e.g. Sebenius, 1992 , Thompson, 2009 have all underlined the importance of negotiation modes as well. Generally, arguing enhances the generation and diffusion of ideas and thus foster agreement (Deitelhoff and Muller, 2005 , Hopmann, 1995 , Ulbert et al., 2004 . A deliberative discourse can influence parties' perception of an issue, the related interests, and eventually negotiation position (Ulbert, et al., 2004, 34) .
Later in the negotiations, an integrative dialogue facilitates compromise by uncovering win-win options. In contrast, the mode of positional bargaining implies a demand-and threat-based exchange between parties to distribute pay-offs. Recent studies have addressed the prevailing Negotiation Management and Multilateral Cooperation uncertainty about the conditions and impact of these discourse modes (Risse and Kleine, 2010) .
The synthesis of constructivist and rationalist IR strands (Hopmann, 2010) , and even of non-IR negotiation analysis (Odell, 2010) has been one way of increasing insight. The common assumption remains, though, that arguing facilitates and positional bargaining undermines agreement (Deitelhoff and Muller, 2005 , Hopmann, 1995 , Thompson, 2009 . This study will shed light on the still underexplored causal mechanism between discourse and outcome (O'Neill, et al., 2004, 163) .
How can we measure negotiation modes using the evidence collected on these negotiations? The type of discourse and its underlying assumptions and goals serve as primary The overall scope condition of the hypotheses is that the initial interests of participating countries neither mostly converge nor mostly collide at the start of the negotiations. In this case of a tipping point of an originally narrow overlap of interests, effective negotiation management can crucially facilitate the converging of positions. In contrast, largely aligned parties agree independent of negotiation management, while even a perfect process cannot convince parties to agree when their interests clash. Interests then suffice to explain behavior. Consensus-based decision-making (e.g. in UNFCCC negotiations as countries cannot agree on rules of procedure)
further enhances the role of negotiation management. Otherwise, parties reach mere majorities more easily through coalition building and may neglect a few dissenting countries. Having laid out the argument on the impact of negotiation management, the following part sketches the research design for probing this framework.
Research Design
The climate case pair was chosen for its salience as a global economic and environmental narrative of the causal chain to approximate probabilistic causality (Bennett, 2004, 22, 35, Bernauer and Mitchell, 2004, 96) . The study sheds light on several causal paths that jointly increase agreement likelihood -as it is questionable to reiterate one causal chain in a linear way given the simultaneous work of myriad factors (George and Bennett, 2005, 212) . The search for alternative variables completes the process tracing. To determine the 'value' of the variables, hypotheses were translated into observable implications for the operationalization (King et al., 1994, 28) . For example, the influence of 'authority of the lead organizer' on outcome could be observed in interviews, where negotiators provided clues about their (dis-)trust of a Conference President, and how this affected their final decisions.
The 'before-after' research design of the case pair strengthens the confidence in the findings of the within-case analysis (Bennett, 2004, 166) . It divides a longitudinal case into two sub-cases (for trade : Odell, 2009, 282) . One variance between subsequent negotiation rounds, like an altered process, can thereby be better isolated for its impact on the change in outcome ('no agreement' versus 'agreement'), as the political structures may be fairly constant. Finally, the cross-case analysis of the wider study beyond this article probes the generalization of the
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climate findings with trade and biosafety negotiations, whose results can only be indicated briefly at the end (Bernauer and Mitchell, 2004, 84) .
What are the methodological caveats? First, the case pair is not selected according to the conformity of the dependent and independent variables with the hypothesis (George and Bennett, 2005, 24) , as we can only determine the value of the myriad variables after a thorough analysis of evidence. Furthermore, the collapse-agreement sequence entails the impact of a prior breakdown and of preceding work on the ensuing negotiation. However, only this sequence holds the negotiation goal constant. For instance, the Cancún summit finally sealed official agreement on a number of issues so that any negotiation afterwards would address a novel goal, which creates a different interest constellation. Yet, in the most-similar case design of a longitudinal case, the compared cases maintain their core setting and may only differ by one aspect, like negotiation management (George and Bennett, 2005, 81 Table 2 ).
Responses were triangulated through two participant observations as researcher and one as member of a major delegation for the purpose of this study at the Cancún, Durban, and Doha climate summits between 2010 and 2012. Possible biases were addressed by the large and diverse set of interviewees, the sorting of evidence in the databank by institutional origin of respondent to check for systemic biases, the anonymity of responses, and participant observation. Only the primary evidence from these interviews provides the information needed for this research question, especially on subjective, micro-level dynamics of decision-making. The material provides a unique source for the otherwise non-public and mostly undocumented processes. The following pair of crucial climate negotiations scrutinizes the proposed hypotheses.
Climate negotiations during the Danish and Mexican Presidencies
Climate Low transparency and exclusiveness thirdly allowed parties to obstruct negotiations on process grounds in Denmark. 19 Unsatisfied with the suggested Accord, delegations used process as a "procedural weapon to torpedo negotiations." 20 In contrast, the widespread conviction of a fair process at COP-16 took away the credibility for 'spoilers' when "playing the process card".
21
For the Mexican Presidency, the transparent and inclusive process was designed to "undermine the obstructionists". 22 Eventually, Saudi Arabia and the ALBA-countries no longer objected to the agreement in the final plenary in Cancún: "It was not possible to attack it as a result of a flawed process." 23 The political price for blocking became too high with only Bolivia willing to pay. 24 The final impact plays out mostly on a subjective level. proved essential: 42 she was thoroughly briefed on all her options for the make-or-break moment to rule on consensus, 43 and thus could manage these crucial hours in a calm and determined way.
Second, Mexican process expertise and cultural-personal fit allowed organizers to better navigate the process of these complex and fragile negotiations. 44 The high empathy of the Mexican COP-President and her lead advisor de Alba provided a good reading of critical situations and their knowledge of core process rules was highly valuable in the heated final days. Espinosa mastered the process and eased moments of suspense with the right tonality.
45
One illustration was Cancún's last day. The storming applause for her by the overwhelming majority made delegates feel that they did "not want to ruin the party" 46 . To the extent that the applause was partially stage-managed, it was an effective trick to use such group dynamics:
"The management of the meeting was the reason why we got an agreement in Cancún." 47 Her effective balancing of restraint and leadership culminated in the decision to state consensus despite Bolivia's objection in the final plenary, which led to the Cancún Agreements. 48 It was a fine line between a violation of UN rules and a legitimate interpretation of consensus. Such a move is of "highest diplomatic art" 49 , and comparable to the consensus decision on the Kyoto
Protocol by diplomat Raúl Estrada.
50
In contrast, the scant process expertise and lower cultural-personal fit of Rasmussen allowed for some grave mistakes. Throughout the Presidency, the proximity of Rasmussen's team to the US undermined the essential prerequisite to be acknowledged as a neutral facilitator -a point frequently observed elsewhere that developed country ministers start with a perceived bias so that developing country ministers tend to have a better standing (e.g. Juan Mayr in biosafety negotiations, Raúl Estrada in climate negotiations). Scarcer process expertise and lower cultural-personal fit also contributed to his mishandling of the last night. 51 He lacked the knowledge and situational empathy to adhere to the most basic rules. Rasmussen's call for a vote on the final text in the closing plenary against the fundamental consensus rule highly "irritated"
parties. 52 Or, as only a few delegations seemed to oppose the Accord, Rasmussen pondered aloud whether they may simply be ignored. "Then you can forget it. That's it," commented a delegate. 53 Finally, the lower cultural-personal fit of lead organizers in Copenhagen diminished their access to delegates. Negotiators scarcely disclosed information and objected to being brought together with adversaries. 54 The The contrast to Mexican Foreign Minister Espinosa was massive (Table 2 ). Her yearlong multilateral experience and strong empathy quickly created trust among delegates. With increasing goodwill, parties forgave process mistakes that may have otherwise caused an outrage. The broad support culminated on Cancún's last day: negotiators gave minute-long standing ovations after she had released the compromise text. This authority was pivotal when she faced the opposition of Bolivia to the final package during the closing plenary. In what was a borderline decision to overrule the explicit objection of one party, Espinosa gaveled consensus on the adoption of the Cancún Agreements. It is difficult to imagine that parties would have accepted such a decision by Rasmussen given his record of process violations.
Connecting to this correlation between authority and agreement, process tracing reveals three paths of authority's impact on outcome. First, greater goodwill in Mexico sidelined some rejections on substance and let parties relax reservation points. 59 Ultimately, negotiators have critical influence over their country's final decision: "There is no such thing as countries. There is 'people'." 60 Espinosa's good standing had altered the openness towards the proposal. Parties were confident that their interests were at least seriously considered. 61 "Patricia was wonderful.
Even though we didn't like some parts we said 'yes' due to the trust and authority she had enjoyed amongst us." 62 Eventually, Espinosa even had the backing of close to all parties to overrule Bolivia, even of Venezuela: 63 "...the Latin American countries kept silent for their higher level of trust which they had into Espinosa." 64 In turn, delegations rejected the proposal in Copenhagen even though it may have been acceptable for them -as their adoption of the very similar proposal only one year later suggests: "At COP-15, no one helped Rasmussen. He tore down every bridge that one built. At some point, you just don't want any more." Finally, the level of authority influences parties' blockade potential through the respect and caution with which negotiators interact with the Conference President. Parties were less prone to openly block the process in Cancún, as Espinosa had competently dealt with procedural interventions: "She was so good that she could not be pushed around by countries but would put them back into their place if they tried." 69 A dishonest process intervention against Espinosa would have meant attacking a respected broker and damaged a country's reputation. 70 Taking process objections off the table in Cancún therefore significantly strengthened Espinosa, compared to Rasmussen in Copenhagen. 71 Rasmussen's poor track record invited the few opposing countries to jeopardize the agreement on procedural grounds adding to the chaotic and heated atmosphere of the final night. 72 It allowed them to act as guardians of process, and not saboteurs of substance.
Negotiation mode (hypothesis 4).
Considering parties overall during the Danish Presidency, the more constructive arguing of preparatory negotiations gave way to positional bargaining in Copenhagen (Table 2) . Parties were fighting for their positions in a high pressure situation fearing to lose out in a far-reaching agreement. They hardly made progress until the political high-level segment opened. In contrast, the US and BASIC-countries had a more integrative dialogue in their exclusive small group meeting of the last day and thereby achieved at least a political compromise on core issues. Yet, their last minute proposal reached the thousands of 68 Umbrella-Group (1) other delegates too late, who were moreover offended by the intransparent and exclusive process.
In preparing for Cancún, the organizers had therefore emphasized a broad and frank exchange between parties. They convened informal, issue-specific consultations during the year on pivotal negotiation issues. Based on the same idea to enhance understanding between groups and to generate ideas, were exchanges in fora like the Petersberg Dialogue. The atmosphere of this informal meeting of environmental ministers initiated by Germany and Mexico was good, and negotiations picked up speed in May. 73 The conciliatory spirit continued in Cancún (Table   2 ). In its second week, the inclusive consultations on core issues led by ministers from a developing and a developed country each contributed to a constructive, interest-revealing mode.
Their political guidance helped expert negotiators to open up, so they finally exchanged more on the interests underlying their positions, instead of merely fighting for the greater gain or avoidance of costs in a tit-for-tat fashion.
Having established the correlation between negotiation mode and outcome, process To conclude, the evidence so far supports the four initial hypotheses that negotiation management affected the climate negotiation outcomes through an objective and subjective level. Let us now consider alternative explanations. Domestic stability is a central concern for the Communist Party to maintain the one-party system (Conrad, 2012) . Accordingly, it prioritizes short-term, steep economic growth over the mid-term consequences of climate change. 92 China therefore shies away from far-reaching international commitments on its massive emissions. However, it has begun to recognize the potential of low-carbon technology for "greening" its economy and for exporting high-tech products. In Copenhagen, an overly tight negotiation mandate resulted from these internal debates. The Chinese administration as a whole was not ready for a far-reaching agreement. 
Conclusion
The evidence from the climate regime suggests that effective negotiation management augments the probability of an agreement in multilateral negotiations. It supports the four initial hypotheses that effective management requires a relatively transparent and inclusive process (Hypothesis 1), highly capable organizers (Hypothesis 2), a lead organizer with authority (Hypothesis 3), and more arguing than bargaining (Hypothesis 4). It enlarges the zone of possible agreement and creates the willingness of negotiators to agree. Regarding Copenhagen, an in-depth Danish study of the Presidency summarized the key drivers in a similar vein (Meilstrup, 2010, 134) : "The behind-the-scenes story about internal fighting over strategy and process in the government, the clear divisions between Hedegaard's and Rasmussen's statements and the loss of lead negotiator Becker nourished news stories with a not so flattering picture of Denmark."
The pressure from the prior breakdown and the availability of preceding compromises of
Copenhagen were important drivers that worked in addition to negotiation management. Finally, it must be acknowledged that Cancún accepted a lower level of ambition. In contrast to negotiation management, the constant structural factors of interests, power, and problem structure appear less suited to explain the variance in outcomes.
The wider study behind this article indicates the plausibility of findings for other regimes and so its wider representativeness. 109 The scope here allows only a brief, concluding snapshot of these case pairs. The first salient trade negotiations after the creation of the WTO were held between 1999 and 2001 about beginning a new trade round. Preparatory talks in 1999 were already troubled with clashes over the succession of the WTO Director-General (Jawara and Kwa, 2003, 187, 190, Wolfe, 2004, 580) . The US-hosted Seattle summit was equally turbulent, with massive anti-globalization protests outside and continuing hostilities inside. The summit eventually broke down after several days with bitter resentment against the dismal organization (Bayne, 2000, 136) and non-inclusive, intransparent, and biased facilitation of the US (Bayne, 2000 , 131, 139, ICTSD, 1999e, Odell, 2009 , 285, Odell, 2005 . 110 The emerging large developing countries no longer tolerated any outcome from such a process (Bayne, 2000, 135) . 111 Seattle ended as a lost opportunity with forfeited benefits (ICTSD, 1999d) . The following thorough change of negotiation management in Geneva, inter alia towards transparency and inclusiveness re-established lost trust (Jawara and Kwa, 2003 , 194, Moore, 2003 , 124, Odell, 2009 . 112 Organizers of the 2001 Doha summit also had greater process expertise and better prepared for the talks (Wolfe, 2004, 580) . Supported by superb organization and facilitation, delegates eventually agreed to launch the Doha Development Agenda. (Enright, 2002 , 100, IISD, 1999 , and Cartagena nearly reached a stalemate. Eventually, a compromise text was forwarded to political leaders at the summit, but not adopted given widespread hostilities and vocal protest against the intransparent and directive process. After Cartagena, the new leadership under skilful and empathetic Juan Mayr (Davenport, et al., 2012 , 45, IISD, 2000 , Nevill, 2002 profoundly altered the negotiation format and guaranteed each party the participation in, or at least observation of, small group negotiations ('Vienna setting') (Samper, 2002, 67) . Mayr informed all delegations diligently about schedule and progress (Mayr, 2002, 227) . Tensions between parties decreased and so the Montreal summit eventually reached the widely praised biosafety agreement in 2000 (Bail et al., 2002 , 516, Gupta, 2000 What does this research contribute to IR? First and in the spirit of regime theory of inclusionary approaches (Keohane and Victor, 2011 , Odell, 2010 , Osherenko and Young, 1993 , Woolcock, 2011 , it provides a framework of multilateral negotiations, which highlights the role of negotiation management in IR by integrating structural and negotiation management variables, and their paths of effect on outcome. It adds to the understanding of why the initial climate summit collapsed, and why countries subsequently reached agreement. Systemic approaches are, in turn, well-equipped to account for longer-term developments, such as the limited progress on substantial climate protection. In this sense, structure and process complement each other over the short-to long-term cycle of multilateral cooperation. Second, it supports and refines specific strands of negotiation management theories. Third, this research
adds an abundant collection of first-hand evidence on a salient global issue to the field of IR,
which fed a database comprising all structural and negotiation management factors. It allows for a numerical and structured analysis of each of these variables, while accounting for the origin of respondents and related biases. In a nutshell, climate negotiations revealed a 'power of process'
and that negotiation management can contribute to reaching multilateral cooperation on salient global challenges.
